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Abstract
Put simply, the Exchange must position itself for a turn-of-the-millennium environment shaped,
in part, by three powerful forces. First, we are as impacted as any other institution by the current
changes in the economics and engineering of telecommunications and computational capacity.
Second, enterprises in the more free-market industrial democracies, as well as those in more state-
oriented countries, are turning to the use of equity finance at a pace that is unmatched in history.
Third, two of our most important constituent groups, the fifty-one million U.S. retail investors and
the ten thousand U.S. institutions with significant equity exposure, are going through a one-time,
secular shift in their approach to ownership of non-U.S. equities. When this process levels out,
reaching some more appropriate geographical balance for the typical U.S. equity portfolio, the
U.S. equity markets and their customers will not be as they are today.
GLOBALIZATION OF THE
EQUITY MARKETS*
Richard A. Grasso **
I have spent a large portion of my adult life and all of my
professional career working at the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE" or "Exchange"). In my judgment, the Exchange is a
few years into an entirely new realm, defined by an extraordinary
set of changes in our operating environment. As a result of
these changes, ten years from now the NYSE will be remarkably
different than it is today. Our challenge is to adapt successfully
to these new developments.
Three facts illustrate the change in our operating environ-
ment in the past ten to fifteen years:
* Two-thirds of the companies that we now trade on the
NYSE listed within the last dozen years;1
* In 1981 average daily volume was a bit under forty-seven
million shares;' last year it was 412 million shares;3
" In 1980 there were thirty-eight non-U.S. companies on the
NYSE list, half of which were from Canada.4 At year-end
1996, the non-U.S. list had grown to 290 companies from
forty-two countries around the world.5
The next ten to fifteen years will be even more remarkable.
Put simply, the Exchange must position itself for a turn-of-
the-millennium environment shaped, in part, by three powerful
forces. First, we are as impacted as any other institution by the
* This address was delivered at Fordham University School of Law on January 13,
1997.
** Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Thanks
to Ms. Aigool Khalikov and Ms. Jean Tobin, both of the International & Research
Group, for help in preparing this written version of myJanuary 13, 1997 remarks.
1. Letter from Jean Tobin, International & Research Group, New York Stock Ex-
change, to Professor Constantine N. Katsoris, Fordham University School of Law (Mar.
11, 1997) (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal).
2. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., FAcr BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1995 99 (1996).
3. Record Days Fax and Number of Trading Days Memorandum from the New
York Stock Exchange to the Fordham International LawJournal (Mar. 7, 1997) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
4. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., FAcr BOOK 1981 34 (1981).
5. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Stocks of non-U.S. Corporate Issuers Listed by
Geographic Region, 1996 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished spreadsheets, on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (hereinafter Stocks of non-U.S. Corporate Issuers].
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current changes in the economics and engineering of telecom-
munications and computational capacity. Second, enterprises in
the more free-market industrial democracies, as well as those in
more state-oriented countries, are turning to the use of equity
finance at a pace that is unmatched in history. Third, two of our
most important constituent groups, the fifty-one million U.S. re-
tail investors6 and the ten thousand U.S. institutions with signifi-
cant equity exposure, are going through a one-time, secular shift
in their approach to ownership of non-U.S. equities. When this
process levels out, reaching some more appropriate geographi-
cal balance for the typical U.S. equity portfolio, the U.S. equity
markets and their customers will not be as they are today.
The confluence of this internationalization of U.S. equity
portfolios with the surge in equity issuance is probably one of
the biggest business opportunities placed before the NYSE in the
past one hundred years. It matches the financial revolution this
country experienced in the latter part of the 1800s and the early
GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS CAPITALIZATION
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6. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., supra note 2, at 53.
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1900s as the infrastructure and industrial enterprises that we
now take for granted were created and financed.
I will touch on a few things associated with the technology
challenges we all face. But there is nothing unique to us in this
area. All of us must puzzle through the innovations that are hap-
pening and formulate appropriate strategies. I prefer to focus
on the second two challenges.
It has been less than twenty years since the real impetus for
globalization took hold: it was almost twenty years ago when the
U.K. elections brought Margaret Thatcher to office and her Gov-
ernment began the process of returning state-owned business to
investors' hands. This privatization process, which later moved
onto the European continent and then around the world, has
created a worldwide surge in the supply of equity. Nearly every-
where in the world equity is replacing alternative ways of raising
capital. Firms that traditionally raised capital by issuing debt,
drawing down retained earnings, or obtaining bank loans or gov-
ernment grants, now sell equity to investors to finance their ac-
tivities.
The privatization of state-owned firms, in large part, has
driven a worldwide equity boom. From 1991 to 1996, dramatic
economic and political changes caused governments to sell
nearly US$370 billion in state-owned assets to the private sector,
with 1996's US$86 billion setting an all-time record.7 Govern-
ments accomplished these sales through issuing equity. The in-
creased capitalization of the world's publicly-traded equity indi-
cates this growth: at year-end 1990 it was US$10 trillion, while
today it is about US$20 trillion.8 This dramatic shift to equity
financing generates fundamental changes in the world's capital
markets.
Countries and companies are relying more each year on eq-
uity capital. Other sources of financing, governments, banks,
and internal financing, are shrinking due to large government
7. Achieving Record Level Proceeds in 1996, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Jan. 1997, at 24.
8. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Market Value of Domestic Stocks on World
Exchanges (Mar. 6, 1997) (unpublished spreadsheet, on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal); New York Stock Exchange, unpublished spreadsheet using data
from INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, EMERGING STOCK MARKETs FACTBOOK
(1993) and FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES BouRSES DE VALEURS, FOCUS-MONTHLY STA-
Tis'ncs (Dec. 1996) (Apr. 29, 1997) (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal)
[hereinafter NYSE Spreadsheet].
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budget deficits, a world banking system reluctant to accept large
credit risks, and the inability of internal funds to meet the needs
of rapidly growing enterprises. Because local capital is often lim-
ited, especially in developing countries, reliance on equity has
produced a shift toward raising international equity.
Moreover, equity capital requires a higher level of disclo-
sure to investors. This transparency helps investors overcome
distrust and assists international capital flows. Ten or twenty
years ago, the most common form of international financial out-
flow from member countries of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development9 ("OECD") either to each other
or to the developing world was through bank loans or direct in-
vestment. Today, portfolio investment through bond and equity
markets accounts form the lion's share of capital outflows.
PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL OUTFLOWS FROM
OECD COUNTRIES
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Source: The Financial Silk Road. . . A Fifth Wave of Global Money, Cross Border Equity
Flows, Global Strategy Unit, ING Baring Securities (1995).
The internationalization of capital markets is also being
driven by a massive shift in the holdings of U.S. investors into
non-U.S. equity. In 1983, the market value of U.S. equities com-
prised fifty-three percent of the world capitalization total;"0 by
December 1996, the U.S. portion, about US$8.5 trillion, repre-
9. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 579 (2d ed. 1995).
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") "works to-
ward developing policies on a range of economic, scientific, and social issues." Id.
10. NYSE Spreadsheet, supra note 8.
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sents only forty-two percent.11 Although the United States con-
tinues to grow, the rest of the world grows faster. Additionally,
the costs of acquiring and trading non-U.S. equities have de-
clined for U.S. investors, a result of declining trading costs
abroad and increased availability of non-U.S. equity on relatively
low-cost U.S. public markets.
In the last five years, the non-U.S. stocks component of U.S.
portfolios has nearly doubled, from just under three percent to
almost six percent of total equity holdings.1 2 Within the next
few years, U.S. investors are expected to again double the non-
U.S. component of their equity portfolios to around twelve per-
cent. This shift of six percentage points in an US$8.5 trillion
portfolio represents over US$500 billion.
HOLDINGS OF NON-U.S. EQUITES IN THE UNITED STATES
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Source: "Flow of Funds Accounts," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
see supra note 12.
Institutional investors, typically at the forefront of invest-
ment trends, lead the movement toward the ownership of non-
11. Id.
12. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS Ac-
COUNTS: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, SECOND QUARTER 1993 111 (Sept. 17, 1993); BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, SECOND QUARTER 1996 88 (Sept. 12, 1996).
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U.S. equity. U.S. institutions have decided to expand their non-
U.S. holdings to between fifteen and twenty percent of their to-
tal portfolios, and a number of the more aggressive or sophisti-
cated institutions have already achieved these levels.13 Corpo-
rate pension funds, on average, have invested about eight per-
cent of their total portfolios in non-U.S. stocks. 4 Public sector
pension funds are also diversifying as many of the restrictions
that have limited their participation in this trend are lifted.
There seems to be little doubt where major U.S. institutions are
headed.
Mutual funds are also surging into global and international
investment vehicles. The number of global and international
mutual funds has grown from 123 in 1989 to 667 at the end of
INCREASING MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES*
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FUND AcriTvy Table 6A (Nov. 1996).
13. America's Largest Overseas Investors, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l ed.), July
1995, at 83; Norma Cohen, International Company News: U.S. Pension Funds Lift Investment
Overseas Despite Market Turmoil, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995, at 25.
14. Barry Rehfeld, Wordly-Wtse Asset Allocation, INSTIuTrONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1997,
at 41.
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November 1996.15 Assets in global and international equity mu-
tual funds grew to US$279 billion in November 1996, a ten-fold
increase since 1990.16
Not surprisingly, this surge in demand for non-U.S. stocks
has brought with it a commensurate spurt in the trading of non-
U.S. issues by U.S. investors. In 1991, purchases and sales of
non-U.S. equities on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange
17
("Amex"), and Nasdaq totaled US$267 billion."i In 1996, aggre-
gate trading of non-U.S. issues reached US$1 trillion. 9
Ten years ago not a single company from Mexico traded on
the Exchange. Today, Mexico represents the third largest na-
tional concentration of non-U.S. stocks on the NYSE, following
Canada and the United Kingdom. 21 In 1995 Telefonos de Mex-
ico became the first company ever to trade more than one bil-
lion shares in a single year.2'
We find ourselves in the dawn of equity globalization, a dra-
matic opportunity for the NYSE. If we list all the U.S. companies
that are qualified to trade on the NYSE, out of the 9000 publicly-
owned companies that are required to report to the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), our list would grow by
about 725 companies, increasing our market value by roughly
ten percent.
To be truly global, a critical mass of the 2300 overseas com-
panies that meet NYSE quantitative listing requirements need to
be available for trading on the Exchange. The ramifications of
success are impressive. The market capitalization of the largest
third of the qualified international companies is equal to two-
thirds of the current NYSE market capitalization. This opportu-
15. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, TRENDS IN MUTUAL
FUND ACTIVITY Table 6A (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND ACTIVITY];
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1991 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 78 (31st ed. 1991)
[hereinafter 1991 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK].
16. TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND AcrTry, supra note 15, at Table 6A; 1991 MUTUAL
FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 15, at 78.
17. The American Stock Exchange ("Amex") is the U.S. stock exchange with the
second largest volume of trading. JOHN DOWNES &JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 16 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF FINANCE].
18. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Trading of Foreign Stocks in the United States
(Mar. 11, 1997) (unpublished spreadsheet, on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
19. Id.
20. Stocks of non-U.S. Corporate Issuers, supra note 5.
21. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., supra note 2, at 16.
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nity to list existing large non-U.S. companies does not include
state-owned companies that will be privatized. The real gains of
globalization are yet to be achieved.
One of the major impediments to international companies
coming to the U.S. marketplace to tap this huge pool of capital
is that in order for an international company to list in the
United States, it must reconcile its financial statements to U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP").22 This can
be a modest or an enormous administrative and financial bur-
den to a company, depending upon its country of origin.
One solution would .be the recognition by the SEC of the
principles produced by the International Accounting Standards
Committee ("IASC") .23 The IASC is making significant progress
in developing a global framework for the public accounts pro-
duced by firms with significant international presence. In the
last two years this process has gained momentum and we expect
that in 1998 the SEC, the global accounting authorities, and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board24 ("FASB") here in the
United States will agree upon a set of global accounting stan-
dards that will allow, for the first time, all issuers, regardless of
country of origin, to use a common format. We believe that the
year 2000 will be the first year that the floodgates open as a re-
sult of that global accounting convention.
When we hit what we believe to be a critical mass of non-
U.S. companies, which may be two or three times the number we
now trade, the marketplace will change more dramatically than
ever in our 205-year history. In 1996, non-U.S. securities trade in
a U.S. format, largely as American Depositary Receipts2 5
22. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 17, at 170-71. Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles ("GAAP") are "conventions, rules, and procedures that define accepted
accounting practice" in the United States. Id.
23. James L. Cochrane et al., Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the
Barriers Separating Supply and Demand, 2 STAN. J. OF L. Bus. & FIN. 241, 259 (Summer
1996) (citing Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Entering US. Markets: Signif-
icant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S 120, S127
(1994)).
24. DICTnONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 17, at 145. The Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board ("FASB") is an independent board that establishes and interprets GAAP.
Id.
25. Id. at 16. An American Depositary Receipt ("ADR") is a "receipt for the shares
of a foreign-based corporation held in the vault of a U.S. bank and entitling the
[holder] to all dividends and capital gains." Id. ADRs are purchased instead of shares
in foreign companies in overseas markets. Id.
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("ADRs"), and are quoted and settled in U.S. dollars. I believe
that there will come a time when non-U.S. securities cannot
trade as a U.S. product. While the financial markets will con-
tinue to service the U.S. retail market through ADRs, denomi-
nated and settled in dollars, the global investor demands the so-
called global product, the ordinary share, quoted and settled in
currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Envision the Exchange
not too many years down the road with five or six hundred non-
U.S. issuers, traded both in an ADR format, quoted and settled
in dollars, and as ordinary shares, traded and settled in the issu-
ers' home currencies, as well as multiple currencies to reflect the
world we live in.
NON-US. COMPANES LISTED ON THE NYSE
1956 TO 1996
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In 1996 alone, fifty-nine non-U.S. companies joined the
NYSE list,26 a record number. For the first time we added a com-
pany from Sub-Saharan Africa, and our first from Russia. I can
go on and on about the firsts, but the impact and the trend line
are much more important. We are becoming a truly global mar-
26. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Historical Listing of non-U.S. Companies
(1996/1997) (unpublished spreadsheet, on file with the Fordham International LawJour-
nal).
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ket. Global MBA programs could not come at a better time in
terms of producing graduates who will be attuned to how the
delivery of financial services will change over the course of the
next dozen or so years.
The last major secular change in financial markets in the
United States occurred around the turn of the last century, as
the industrial composition of the country was undergoing a dra-
matic transformation. There are some interesting parallels be-
tween the U.S. economies of the late 1890s and the late 1990s.
Entire industries were being created then, as they are being cre-
ated today. Both periods are characterized by investors seeking
ways to participate in the creative process and the creators
voraciously seeking capital.
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, share turnover on the
NYSE was at historically high rates, averaging 200-plus percent
per year, compared with sixty-three percent last year, which itself
was high by the standards of the last thirty years. If I were to
apply these turnover rates to the number of shares outstanding
today, the NYSE would be doing an average daily volume of
nearly two billion shares. This month, average daily volume has
been running at about 520 million sharesY.2  To place this
number in context, in my first full year at the Exchange, 520
million shares would have been about one-sixth of the total vol-
ume for the year.28
The NYSE and its member firms have spent the past decade
preparing for today's volume of business. We ourselves have
spent more than a billion dollars during this period on telecom-
munications and computer systems. Now that doesn't sound like
a lot when you look at it through the eyes of a General Electric.
When you look at it through the lens of the NYSE, a billion dol-
lars is a great deal of money, six times our working capital. We
have made a commitment that the Exchange will always be be-
tween two and five years in front of the demand cycle. We are
currently in the process of ratcheting up our trading capacity
from roughly 2.4 billion shares a day to about 3.5 billion.
In addition to expanding our capacity to trade using the
27. Suzanne McGee, Hair-Raising Turns for Stock and Bond Markets, WALL ST.J.,Jan.
13, 1997, at Cl.
28. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., supra note 4, at 63. Mr. Grasso joined the
New York Stock Exchange in April 1968.
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space within which we operate, we are currently exploring op-
tions to expand the amount of space itself. Many people ask me
why we would expand a floor-based system. Why not go to some
kind of black-box, automated trading process? I believe in the
benefits of a physically-convened auction market. Pure tele-
phone-screen dealer markets, such as London and Nasdaq, have
their place as excellent trading systems for certain types of stocks
and certain types of order flow, that is, thinly-traded stocks or
when the order flow consists of predominantly large orders.
Computerized order-matching systems in which natural buyers
and sellers can meet have many advantages, but some disadvan-
tages, including the fact that when market imbalances occur it is
difficult to inject human intervention in the trading process to
break up logjams. We will continue to use a floor-based system,
applying more and more technology to pre- and post-trade
processes.
Advocates of screen-based trading often tell me that global-
ization will be the downfall of physically-convened auction mar-
kets. The demand to trade stocks at the NYSE continues to grow
from outside the U.S. business day time zones, and there is only
a given amount of time each day a person can stand on the NYSE
floor and participate in a rigorous trading process. I believe that
the way around this problem is to break the seat into time frames
so that a seat-holder would pass the trading privileges associated
with the seat to another person. As a trader, I would operate my
seat from 9:30 in the morning until 4:00 in the afternoon. Then
I would pass it to a partner or business associate who would oper-
ate it from, say, 4:15 to midnight. That person would in turn
pass it to another who would operate it from, perhaps, 12:15
a.m. to 7:00 a.m. Semi-continuous, multi-currency, twenty-four-
hour trading: no other marketplace in the world has the techno-
logical capability, the infrastructure and the product base to do
that.
I hope that this evening I have given you some sense of the
excitement my colleagues and I feel about the next five to ten
years at the NYSE. We are becoming a global marketplace; and
we are managing the introduction of technologies that were
unimaginable twenty years ago.
Thank you very much for your invitation to speak with you
this evening. I would be happy to entertain a question or two.
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QUESTION: With regard to the ADRs that you mentioned,
going forward, do you think ADRs are going to play a part in
globalization for the NYSE? Or will you go to more direct list-
ings?
MR. GRASSO: I believe that the ADRs will continue to be a
very important ongoing tool, particularly for retail investors in
the United States. I don't think at this juncture the retail inves-
tor is prepared to accept currencies other than the U.S. dollar,
the difficulty of dealing with dividends in other currencies, or
the transfer problems inherent in transferring ordinary securi-
ties in the home country marketplace. So I think the conven-
ience of the ADR makes it a necessary and long-lived investment
tool going forward.
But the ADR will be augmented by U.S. institutional de-
mand for the ordinary shares, in local currencies. As you get
away from the ordinaries, you create breakage, the breakage of
conversion from ordinaries to ADRs and of conversions from lo-
cal currencies to the U.S. dollar. That breakage creates differen-
tiated returns that can be very important to a global asset man-
ager's ability to retain accounts.
So I think the two will operate in parallel. I think the retail
investor here in the United States will always want the ADR. The
institutional investor has already indicated, through tapping the
home markets of non-U.S. issuers, the capacity to accept the dif-
ficulties in transfer and dealing in local currencies.
QUESTION: Accounting standards have always been a hin-
drance to a lot of companies in Europe coming into the U.S.
marketplace, such as the NYSE, because of the disclosure of in-
formation that they feel is confidential. Is this going to be liber-
alized?
MR. GRASSO: U.S. accounting and financial disclosure
have contributed enormously to the breadth and depth of the
U.S. market. So I'm not an advocate of wholesale abolition of
our standards. I am a believer that businesses, particularly in a
truly global economy, look more and more like global businesses
rather than domestic businesses, and, therefore, there needs to
be some reconciliation between the traditional domestic prac-
tices here in the United States and the traditional domestic prac-
tices in other markets. I do not believe it would be fruitful to try
wholesale abolition of what we have here in the United States.
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Our standards have served us well. They have bred a public con-
fidence in the marketplace that has created liquidity and a uni-
verse of ownership that is unlike any market anywhere.
We have some 51 million Americans who are direct partici-
pants in our markets, another 110 or so million indirect partici-
pants in the markets. I think that breadth and depth is evidence
of the confidence that the U.S. public has in the openness and
frequency of financial disclosure here in the United States.
I do believe, however, that if you were to look at some of our
international companies, you really do raise the question of
whether U.S. GAAP should be the prevailing convention or
whether there should be some reconciliation to reflect the fact
that much of the earning power of a Citicorp or an Exxon or an
IBM is done or achieved outside of the U.S. framework. I think
you can create a standard that protects investors and yet allows
issuers a greater global approach to their financial statements.
Thank you for the question. It's important that audiences un-
derstand our position on global accounting standards.
As you go from country to country, some countries have
conventions of accounting practice that are much more strin-
gent than those of the United States. Others have some that are
still in an embryonic state. So you must take almost a country-by-
country approach. What has served us well is a level of confi-
dence that the investors in the market have in the frequency,
whether good or bad, but the frequency and comparability of
issuer financial statements. So I think, to their credit, the SEC,
the FASB, and the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee have looked at a global set of standards that would satisfy the
needs of international investors, create a comparability of disclo-
sure, and yet allow some companies the opportunity to come to
the United States and tap the pool of capital that is here.
QUESTION: Situations in the 1980s were very different
from the current levels of fluctuations we have in the 1990s. We
have now experienced close to ten years since we have put in the
fifty-point circuit breakers. Can you elaborate on where that's
going?
MR. GRASSO: For those who may have been out of the
country on the 19th of October of 1987, it was what I refer to as a
minor modification of the valuation model in the United States.
We never use anything that rhymes with the word "rash" in our
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discussions of 1987. The circuit breakers and so-called shock ab-
sorbers that were introduced into the marketplace after the
break in 1987 address two very separate sets of concerns.
The macro concern was the public's unwillingness to accept
a twenty-two percent decline in a single trading day. Realize that
on the 19th of October in 1987 the market fell 508 points on 604
million shares. 1996 was the centennial anniversary of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average. It took the average from its creation in
1896 until 1966, some seventy years, to first cross the threshold
of 1000 points. In October 1987, we lost a little more than half
that in one day. So the Brady Commission, consisting of soon to
be Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady and his Brady Com-
mission colleagues from institutions around the country, who
were brought together by President Reagan to study what had
happened, felt that there was a need to take a macro approach
and to say that on any one given trading day, while you might
have fifty point declines, you should take a breather in the mar-
ketplace. Thus, the introduction of the 250 and 400 point one
and two hour breakers, later to be reduced to 30 minutes and
one hour. Most recently we have determined that the 250
should become 350 and the 400 should become 550. That was
the macro approach. The point that troubled so many people
was the accelerant factor of the so-called program trade.
Program trading is a category in the marketplace that on an
average day is about twelve or thirteen percent, half divided be-
tween index arbitrageurs, half between the so-called tactical asset
managers. The index arbitrageurs are simply spreading the for-
ward in Chicago against the cash in New York, either buying dis-
counted futures in Chicago and selling the underlying basket of
500 securities, or the reverse, depending on the premium rela-
tionship, with the balance being the tactical asset managers, who
are constantly rebalancing.
The fifty-point rule was designed not to take a time out, not
to prevent that category of participant from being in the market,
but rather to say, on the plus side or on the negative side of fifty,
that the participant, the index arbitrageur, could do whatever he
or she chose to do. Once the marketplace was down more than
fifty or up more than fifty, however, that participant was con-
verted from a consumer of market liquidity to a provider of li-
quidity. A consumer of market liquidity buys discounted futures
and sells stocks, creating weight on, if you will, the cash market,
1121
1122 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1108
buying further discounted futures and accelerating the process
down or accelerating it upward. At or above the fifty-point
threshold, that participant had to counter the trend, had to be-
come a provider of liquidity to the marketplace. Today, when
the market ticks up or down greater than fifty, the participant
can continue the strategy, but only in a market counterbalancing
nature. Now that small change, converting from consumer of
liquidity to a provider, in effect hits the brakes on that category
of trading.
We can debate whether a 2400 Dow with a 250/400 macro
circuit breaker corresponds to a 6600 Dow with a 350/550 cir-
cuit breaker. I had that debate for the better part of the year
and basically had no conclusive evidence one way or the other,
but I was kind of tired of the debate going on. It is reasonable to
say the market has tripled, and we have not changed the 250/
400 circuit breaker, so let's make the band width a bit wider. But
the fifty-point band will not change. The absence of a fifty point
band width is the accelerant that can get you to 350 quickly.
We have only had one 250-point-plus decline in the history
of U.S. markets in a single trading session, but I will only use as a
comparator the fact that we have had two 600-point moves in the
U.S. stock market in the last decade. One occurred on a day
when everyone can recall exactly where they were, October 19,
1987. Few people recall the second. It began on the August
morning that we awoke in 1990 to learn that Saddam Hussein
had decided to expand his real estate. The Dow was at 3000 at
that point. Eleven weeks later, the Dow was at 2400. Same 600
points, but without the human cry, without a year-and-a-half
worth of my colleagues and I sitting before various congressional
committees trying to explain what had happened on the 19th of
October. The evidence, albeit anecdotal, is the slower the de-
cline, the less likely you are going to lose public confidence. In
fact, you can make an argument that when there are dips in the
market, whether a dip in 1989, a dip in 1990, or a dip in the
summer of 1996, the Dow moves almost straight-line from 5100
to close to 5700, and then suddenly the technology stocks are
out of favor. Then buyers emerge.
In July of last year, you got almost a 500-point decline in a
week or so time frame. There is an argument that the public
pours in and counterbalances that, so long as you do not experi-
ence the free-fall nature of the nineteenth of October.
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It is a long about way of saying, if you were about to argue
why, if we are changing 250/400, should we not change the fifty-
point rule, I do not believe the two are comparable. One ad-
dresses a technical, sophisticated category of the market that few
people understand and even fewer people deploy, and, yet, it
can become a true shock wave into the marketplace.
If you want to really understand what happened on the
nineteenth of October, read the footnotes of the Brady report.
You will find in one of those footnotes, thirteen institutions hit
the door simultaneously. Analogize to putting fifty elephants in
a room and letting them all try and go out the door at the same
time. There is a predictable result. Program trading, tactical as-
set allocators, and the so-called index arbitrageurs, while they do
not like the fifty-point rule, they're willing to accept it as a social
cost of being able to continue in the business using that strategy.
QUESTION: Given the enormous impact that institutions
have on trading, can you see the role of the retail customer in
the future?
MR. GRASSO: I believe that the institutionalization of the
market has been enormously positive for the U.S. markets in
general, and, in particular, for the NYSE. At the end of 1996, if
you were to look at one common stock fund, the Fidelity Magel-
lan Fund, and you were to turn the page back to 1980, that fund
would have represented the entirety of the mutual fund indus-
try's allocation to equity securities. One fund. During the
1980s, if you were not an active investor, simply a passive inves-
tor, an indexation participant, the decade of the 1980s produced
roughly a 15.25 percent compounded annual rate of return by
just buying the S&P 500. In terms of the twentieth century, that
is a premium of almost fifty percent over fixed income alterna-
tives. That is why I believe the United States has fallen in love
with equity investments.
We are in a unique period. I believe we are in a period
where the people live longer, retire earlier, and are less likely to
believe that the traditional safety nets provided by government
in the post-employment years will be there for them. We are in a
period where the traditional philosophy in this country, which
said that at age fifty-five I will begin to move into conservative,
risk-averse investments, no longer works. Whether it's the envi-
ronmental differences, parental dependency, grandchild depen-
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dency, or a troubled public health care finance system, there is
only one way, if you subscribe to some of those environmental
elements, that you can deal with the next quarter century, and
that is by being an investor in equities.
Now that does not mean rolling the die on the shares of the
electric spoon company. The 1980s demonstrated that you can
be a conservative investor and do well. Think ofjust a few simple
names, such as Coca-Cola and General Electric. If you choose
not to be a stock picker, pick an index. The S&P 500 last year
was up twenty percent. The DowJones Industrial 30 last year was
up twenty-six percent, following a year when it was up thirty-
three percent. That is not to suggest those returns are going to
continue. It is simply to underline that there is a driving force to
your point of new money coming into the marketplace, provided
it is patient capital, willing to be in the marketplace for a period
in excess of five years.
If you look at the cycles of equity prices in the twentieth
century and bought the basket that represented any one of the
wide indices at the wrong moment in the cycle and held for a
period of seven years or greater, you always had a premium re-
turn over the fixed income alternative. If you were lucky to sim-
ply buy in the middle, you had a huge premium. If you bought
closer to October 19th or to other down periods, such as the
fourth quarter of 1990, you had a huge premium.
QUESTION: Looking at what the United States did 200
years ago, I think that you can create one major stock exchange
and some additional markets too, like the Amex and Nasdaq, for
example. How do you plan to compete with European and
emerging markets, especially after the acceptance of a common
European currency?
MR. GRASSO: Your question is an excellent one. I think
you've got to look at the dynamics that underlie why issuers tap
various markets and where investor pools lie. Again, whether it
is our advantage of the better part of one hundred years,
whether it is the technological advantage, or whether it is the
breadth of ownership advantage in the U.S. markets, we find
ourselves today with the broadest and deepest pool of investors
anywhere in the world. When issuers privatize from state hands
to investor hands, there is only one capital market that has the
breadth and depth to be able to provide the capital that they
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seek in that primary financing, and that is here in the United
States.
When the Euro 9 is completed, and presuming there is a
single market in Europe, will we be able to compete? Will it be
an "either/or" cannibalization? I would say no. I believe that
markets will be complementary in the following sense. If you
were to look today at the experience of the NYSE, we do not
have offices throughout the world. We create windows to those
various sectors outside of the United States by using advisory
boards. I have an Asian-Pacific advisory board, a European advi-
sory board, and a Latin American advisory board. What we try to
do is create a partnership with local markets. Not that we are
going to trade common product in a continuous sense, but
rather a recognition that some companies will always trade pri-
marily in the domestic arena, such as NTT in Japan.
Markets will sort the competitive results by pools of indus-
trial interest. If, in fact, you can stimulate a domestic market to a
breadth and interest equivalent to the U.S. market, you are go-
ing to see those issuers trade primarily in those markets. Capital
moves around the globe in nanoseconds. It moves with the
speed of technology. If you were to look at our consumer busi-
ness, we take an order from anywhere in the world, introduce it
into the agency-auction price discovery, execute it, and have it
back at point of origin in twenty-two seconds. My ten year old
son says, "why so long?" He thinks I am a dinosaur. Now that is
what defines the difference between the NYSE and the vertical
markets. In the vertical markets, the screen-based markets, sell-
ers hit bids and take offers, and I can, in that model, collapse my
turnaround time to three seconds. But that is extraneous to the
question you raised. The question you raise is where will the
market evolve and be most vibrant? The answer is in that arena
that has the largest pool of investors, a transparency, a confi-
dence level, and a regulatory umbrella that stimulates investor
participation.
One of the things that we do pro bono for markets around
the world is spend a lot of time trying to teach them the process
of the U.S. secondary markets. We willingly share all of our tech-
29. The Euro is "the single currency that the European Monetary Union will con-
vert to in 1999." Ellen Leander, The Euro: "No Cying Need to do Anything", TREASURY &
RISK MANAGEMENT, Apr. 1997, at 15.
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nology and all of our know-how with emerging markets, reposi-
tioning markets because if those markets succeed, we ultimately
will be benefactors. We listed our first Russian company and our
first Ghanian company in 1996 because we made a strategic in-
vestment in creating know-how in those arenas sufficient to stim-
ulate their start-up of their markets.
Your question, though, is an interesting one because when
Europe, and I believe it will happen, creates the single currency,
some say it will be much more difficult for markets outside of
Europe. I think it will be a lot easier because we will not have to
go to a cross currency in five or six different options, but simply
will be trading the Euro against the dollar. I believe it is going to
stimulate a lot of developmental activity here in the United
States.
So I am not a believer in the "either/or" theory. In fact,
when issuer companies that are considering going outside of
their home arena ask the question in a public forum, "Should we
list in Tokyo, should we list in London, should we list in Frank-
furt, or should we list in New York," my answer is all of the above.
Because I think to the extent that a company can raise investor
interest in all of those markets or in several of them, it is to that
company's advantage to list on them.
QUESTION: As global investment grows, U.S. investors are
going to have to deal with a lot of different tax regimes. Do you
think this will deter the investors? What if U.S. investors are
treated differently than home market investors?
MR. GRASSO: Any country that puts in some sort of a pen-
alty, whether it is an interest equalization tax or some sort of
transfer tax, hurts itself and hurts its own markets. To the extent
that they seek our counsel, we always, even though it is not in
our self interest, suggest that countries not do this because it will
limit their competitiveness in the global theater.
If you look at, for instance, the Nordic countries up until
about two or two-and-a-half years ago, they had some onerous
taxing on domestic securities markets. They lost all of their mar-
kets to London. As I said, markets move with the speed of fiber
optics. To the extent that you have a confiscatory tax policy in
the domestic arena, market activity will move offshore.
There was a perfect example of that here in the United
States, something called the Interest Equalization Tax ("IET") in
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1963. When we imposed the IET we created the offshore Euro
market. We did it ourselves. We did not need any help!
QUESTION: How do you see the proposed changes in So-
cial Security affecting capitalization of the market?
MR. GRASSO: Well, you are going to be surprised to hear
me say this because if, in fact, you take the most aggressive ap-
proach and assume that forty percent of the trust fund gets
rededicated to the equities markets, that is US$200 billion.
US$200 billion against a US$7.7 trillion market does not do a lot
in the near-term.
Most people, when they read about the three alternatives,
think enactment of any one will be a great day at 11 Wall Street.
I do not think it is a quick shot in the arm to the marketplace. I
think, however, that it is an important tool for public policy.
There is, you know, a social security system on the one hand that
is probably one of the most successful transfer payment systems
we have ever created. Yet on the other hand, we know that an
increasing number of U.S. taxpayers is required to fund the sys-
tem. The amount of benefits paid to recipients has grown from
US$7 million a half century ago to US$2.2 trillion or whatever it
is today, and at some point the bank runs dry.
So there has to be, I think, an alternative that creates pre-
mium returns. You have to be very careful. Public policy does
not modulate this correctly. You do not want to end up with a
person nearing the end of his or her working life having to take
a roll of the die because he or she invested poorly over the last
thirty or thirty-five years. So you have to risk-adjust to age tables.
I think you also have to have a prudent person standard applied
to determine what is a suitable investment.
Lastly, I think the idea of the government investing for us is
not a good one, but you would expect me to say that.
QUESTION: When does the Exchange expect to actually
be able to trade ordinaries? I was under the impression that
there was a plan in place, but that it got pulled.
MR. GRASSO: Well, the plan was not implemented. What
really dissuaded us from launching it is the fact that we do not
find ourselves today in the position we thought we might be in,
in terms of the number of non-U.S. companies that are on the
NYSE. There is a need to build a critical mass. For us to launch
ordinary share, multi-currency trading, we are going to ask the
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users of the NYSE, the broker-dealer members, to make signifi-
cant infrastructure investments.
You cannot in good conscience as the operator of a business
ask people to make such investments if they are uneconomic. So
we would rather wait until we have got a scale of business oppor-
tunity that would produce at least a recognizable rate of return,
if not an immediate rate of return, to the broker-dealers who are
going to have to invest in that infrastructure. Everything we are
doing from a technological standpoint is being engineered to
accommodate the so-called ordinary non-U.S. script product.
But that, from our standpoint, is a lot more economic than from
the point of view of the 600 broker-dealer members of the NYSE.
Recognize we are at the center of that activity. If you have got a
business that has perhaps only five or six transactions a day that
might remotely be in need of this product, you cannot afford to
be there as a broker-dealer member. So we are going to hold
until we think we have scale. My guess if I have to give you a
time table, because I am the one that created the first timetable,
that we have not met, I will give you a new one. When we get to
about 450 non-U.S. companies, which is roughly a fifty percent
growth factor in what we have today, and that is not too far away.
That is probably eighteen months, maybe thirty-six months from
today. I thank you very much for having me here tonight.
